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Assessing the Briggs Approach 
to Political Refugee Policy
Larry Nackerud
University of Georgia
Vernon Briggs’s legacy in the landscape of U.S. immigration policy 
is secure. His research and writings are extensive, stretching from 1965 
to today, and he is recognized as a leading national and international 
expert in his fi eld. The accolades for his work, the stature of his coau-
thors, and the never-ending list of scholars who cite his publications, all 
speak to Briggs’s footprint on U.S. immigration policy. This chapter, 
however, is not about Briggs’s wide-ranging work in immigration pol-
icy; rather, it is focused on a more narrowly defi ned policy arena about 
which he was passionate—political refugee and asylee policy. In this 
chapter I posit that, while Briggs writes and speaks often of political 
refugee and asylee policy, his work in this area is ripe for extension, and 
yes, even debate. I am confi dent that Briggs will encourage and support 
such work, as nothing signifi es Briggs’s work more than discourse, de-
bate, and lively discussion.
This confi dence is bolstered by my personal experience with Briggs. 
In the mid 1980s, I studied at Cornell University to pursue an interest in 
social policy analysis. I sought knowledge about federal social policy 
formulation, local-level impact, and community-driven efforts to shape 
or modify those policies. Given this interest, Alan Hahn (my graduate 
committee chair) recommended I take a seminar in immigration and po-
litical refugee policy from “this fellow” over in the School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations.
As the seminar’s fi rst session was about to begin, Briggs shuffl ed 
into the classroom with a pile of books and well-worn notes under his 
arm. He placed the books and notes in front of him on the table and 
began to speak. I remember initially thinking, “This will be a long se-
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mester.” Quickly, though, Briggs won me over. I was soon captivated 
by the breadth and depth of his historical and technical knowledge of 
immigration as well as of political refugee and asylee policy.
Briggs promoted academic dialogue and civil discourse. He encour-
aged students to express differing opinions and challenging questions 
in respectful and informed ways. He provoked an appreciation for 
the “unending conversation” that is central to the academic dialogue 
(Bruffee 1997). Critical to Briggs’s view of such dialogue was that stu-
dents should understand that academic work, be it teaching, research, 
or writing, is merely a conduit to a conversation of persons who are, 
in important ways, “fundamentally disagreeing” (Bean 2001, p. 18). 
Anyone who has followed Briggs’s career is aware of his extraordinary 
ability to disagree, to state an opinion contrary to the popular view, and 
to do so with respect for others. For evidence of this unique ability, 
one need look no further than his recent public testimony, “Real Im-
migration Reform: The Path to Credibility,” before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives (Briggs 2007).
I experienced fi rsthand Briggs’s ability to encourage and support 
dialogue, even when there was political incongruence. In the classroom 
and during the years he was on my doctoral committee, it was clear 
that, although Briggs and I shared an interest in political refugee and 
asylee policy, our politics were not in complete congruence (on matters 
including the role of government, the position of humanitarian concerns 
in policymaking, and our concerns about the economy). I cringed when 
I heard Briggs say something to the effect that every person admitted to 
the United Stated should be fi rst judged for her or his capacity to posi-
tively contribute to the economy. I would sometimes counter, “Even in 
the world of political refugee policy?” Not always, but often, Briggs, 
after a pensive pause, would answer in the affi rmative.
His talk of neutrality with respect to political ideology and eco-
nomic accountability for each U.S. entry decision sometimes struck me 
as cold. I came to realize, though, that our common interest in societal 
equity and the well-being of people seeking refuge in another country 
was merely constructed and expressed differently. Moreover, it was his 
tolerance of difference that contributed mightily to my oft-confi rmed 
belief in Briggs as the “consummate academic.” At the core of such an 
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academic, in my opinion, is a willingness to nurture the expression of a 
varying belief held by another.
When asked to write this chapter, I fi rst read and reacquainted my-
self with many of Briggs’s works, including books and journal articles. 
I was struck by the extensive use of three considerations in his writing: 
economic accountability for each entry decision into the United States, 
neutrality with respect to political ideology, and societal equity. That 
threefold emphasis is the point of departure for this chapter: Can these 
considerations ever become the foundation for decision making in the 
complex arena of political refugee and asylee policy? This chapter con-
siders that question through a review of the scholarship of Briggs and 
others.
HISTORY AS THE CONTEXT
 Regardless of whether one is attempting to emulate Briggs or 
seeking to thoughtfully examine his three considerations (economic ac-
countability, political neutrality, and societal equity), there can be only 
one starting point—history. Briggs, the consummate historian, started 
nearly each class and written piece with a historical review, particu-
larly past policy developments. In this section, as a means of setting the 
foundation for a discussion of his three considerations, I present a brief 
history of U.S. political refugee policy, followed by a synopsis of the 
current state of affairs in U.S. political refugee policy.
In the historical section of his classic work, Immigration and Amer-
ican Unionism, Briggs states that issues surrounding accommodation 
of political refugees or asylees did not concern U.S. policymakers until 
the 1930s (Briggs 2001). In fact, prior to the passage of the Immigration 
Act of 1924, there was little need to be concerned about how the United 
States might respond to the needs of persons who sought to escape per-
secution in their homeland. In short, if they could get to the United 
States, they were generally admitted. The era of entrance upon arrival 
ended with the Immigration Act of 1924. It was not until after World 
War II that political refugee accommodation moved to a prominent po-
sition within the international community and the United States. In fact, 
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the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which President Harry Truman fi rst 
promoted in 1945, was the fi rst-ever piece of U.S. legislation focused 
solely on political refugee accommodation (Briggs 2003a).
Internationally, the world of political refugee accommodation 
witnessed a watershed event in 1951: the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Political Refugees. The Status provided the 
now classic defi nition of a person seeking refugee or asylee status:1
[O]wing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling 
to return to it. (Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 1951)
Providing a backdrop for the 1951 Convention was passage of the 
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948. Of the 30 
articles expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights, none was more 
applicable to a discussion of political refugee and asylee policy than 
Article 14, which indicated that everyone has the right to seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution (Offi ce of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 1948).
As the international community embraced a more rights-based and 
nondiscriminatory conscience for the consideration of the movement 
of people about the world, the United States countered with the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, which continued to employ a 
discriminatory, national-origins admission system (Briggs 2003a). Per-
sons described as refugees continued to come to the United States in the 
1930s, 1940s, and even 1950s; however, they did so at a time when the 
overall immigration levels were low.
After passage of the Political Refugee Relief Act of 1953, it was 
the parole authority of the Eisenhower administration that had the most 
profound impact on political refugee policy. The use of parole authority 
to bring refugees into the country was fi rst used in 1956 and culminated 
with the admission of several hundred thousand Indochinese as part 
of the Indochinese Refugee Act of 1977 (Jeffreys 2007). Interestingly, 
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the use of the parole authority admission process for political refugees 
continued even after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, which 
specifi ed 17,400 visas for political refugees worldwide (Briggs 2001).
Another document, equal internationally to the impact of the 1951 
Convention, was the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees. This prohibited any nation from returning a person 
claiming to be a refugee to a country where her or his life or freedom 
would be threatened. The United States signed onto the Protocol in 
1968 (Jeffreys 2007), and this concept of “non-refoulement” took its 
place in U.S. political refugee and asylee policy deliberations.
In 1978, the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Politi-
cal Refugee Policy (SCRIP) was formed. The commission was charged 
with bringing some sense to the country’s admission policies. While the 
work of SCRIP was extensive and historically well regarded, it was the 
refugee-producing conditions in Southeast Asia that hurried the U.S. 
Congress to passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Briggs 2001). This 
Act established, at least in theory, a geographically and politically neu-
tral adjudication standard for refugee or asylee status (Jeffreys 2007). 
It did so by removing the previous standard—which involved fl eeing 
Communism or being from the Middle East—and replacing it with the 
persecution standard expressed in the 1951 U.N. Convention (Nackerud 
1993).
The Refugee Act of 1980 essentially removed political refugees 
and asylees from immigration law by eliminating the refugee category 
declared earlier in the Immigration Act of 1965. A new system for the 
admission of political refugees and consideration of asylee status was 
thus created. Central to the new system was a consultation process be-
tween the President and Congress to determine numerical allocations 
and targeted geographic preferences (Nackerud 1993). The Refugee 
Act of 1980 was also designed to stop the use of the parole authority to 
admit large numbers of political refugees without numerical restriction 
(Briggs 2001). It also brought the United States into greater congruence 
with the international community, primarily through adoption of the 
U.N.-sponsored defi nition of who might be judged a political refugee 
or asylee (Nackerud 1993).
Briggs highlighted the fact that asylee policy was the least thought-
through provision of the Refugee Act of 1980. Asylee status was 
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intended to apply to individual cases and no one foresaw that the United 
States would become a nation of fi rst instance for massive numbers of 
persons who, once ashore, would seek political asylum. Within weeks 
of its passage, that is precisely what happened (Briggs 2001, p. 148). 
Over the years, particularly large numbers of asylum seekers from Cuba 
and Haiti would challenge the effectiveness of the 1980 Refugee Act as 
a policy instrument.
That Act specifi ed the creation of the Offi ce of Refugee Resettle-
ment within the Department of Health and Human Services, which 
was charged with ensuring that persons admitted as political refugees 
become self-suffi cient and free from long-term dependence on public 
assistance (Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007). The consultative pat-
tern established in the 1980 Refugee Act continues to this day. Before 
each fi scal year, the President consults with Congress and a worldwide 
refugee admissions ceiling is established. Allocations for each of the six 
geographic regions of the world are set (Jeffreys 2007). From 1980 to 
2006, 2.3 million political refugees were admitted to the United States. 
An additional 344,507 individuals were granted asylum from 1990 to 
2005. Thirty U.S. metropolitan areas and six states, California, Texas, 
Florida, New York, Washington, and Illinois, received over 60 percent 
of all resettled political refugees from 1983 to 2004 (Newland, Tanaka, 
and Barker 2007).
In 2007, political refugees constituted a mere 10 percent of an-
nual overall immigration fl ow to the United States, but they were more 
noticeable as a subpopulation because of their tendency to congregate 
geographically. Refugees have historically congregated in certain major 
metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, but 
they are also now doing so in mid-sized cities such as Sioux Falls and 
Fargo, South Dakota, and Binghamton, New York. For the last seven 
years, the United States has set its annual political refugee admissions 
ceiling at 70,000, a 70 percent decline from where it was set when the 
notion of a numerical limit was fi rst introduced some 28 years ago. 
Despite this downward trend, the United States continues to resettle 
more political refugees overall than any other country, although other 
countries, particularly the Scandinavian social welfare states, resettle 
higher proportions of political refugees relative to the size of their na-
tive populations (Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007).
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Table 5.1 depicts the numerical history of refugee admissions. Of 
particular note are the two years following most closely in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and their historically low 
levels of refugee admissions (26,773 and 28,304 in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively).
Low levels of refugee admissions (relative to those seen before 
2002) continued even after 2002 and 2003. Indeed, the total number 
of political refugees admitted to the United States decreased 23 per-
cent from 2005 (53,738) to 2006 (41,150).  Overall, the annual average 
number of refugee arrivals declined from approximately 100,000 dur-
ing the 1990s to 50,000 during the 2000–2006 period. This decline is 
often attributed to changes in security procedures after September 11, 
2001, as well as admission requirements resulting from the Patriot Act 
of 2001 and the Real ID Act of 2005 (Jeffreys 2007). The composi-
tion of refugees has also shifted over the years, paralleling evolving 
humanitarian crises around the world and often more directly refl ecting 
U.S. foreign policy priorities (Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007). The 
political asylee applicant must meet the same defi nition of persecution 
set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980. Asylee claims have risen through 
the years and claims averaged just over 26,000 a year from 2004 to 
2006 (Jeffreys 2007).
This history and synopsis dovetails with one of Briggs’s main 
historical points; the initial assignment for policy interpretation and 
implementation regarding entry of persons into the United States was 
with the Department of Labor upon its creation in 1913, but the assign-
ment has shifted over time. In 1933, responsibility was transferred to 
the Department of Justice, and in 2003, it was moved to the Department 
of Homeland Security (Briggs 2003a). In 2007, responsibility was di-
vided among three bureaus of the Department of Homeland Security: 
Customs and Border Protection, Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (General Accounting Of-
fi ce 2004).
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NOTE: Data series began following the Refugee Act of 1980. Excludes Amerasian im-
migrants, except in fi scal years 1989 to 1991.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State (2007).
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THE THREE CONSIDERATIONS
Economic Accountability for Each Entry Decision
into the United States
Can economic accountability for each entry decision ever become 
the foundation for decision making in the complex arena of political 
refugee and asylee policy? Even though Briggs’s work in the use of 
economic accountability for overall immigrant entry decisions is exten-
sive and strong, I do not believe it is in the best interest of the United 
States to fully overlay that consideration onto the arena of political refu-
gee and asylee policy. In fact, I believe even some of Briggs’s work on 
economic accountability and political refugee and asylee policy may 
benefi t from a bit of an extension of his ideas.
If a single mantra had to be selected from the legacy of Briggs’s 
work, then the one that most fully embodies his career and impact is the 
notion of linking immigration decisions and economic accountability. 
In almost all writings and speaking opportunities, Briggs proffers this 
idea. In public testimonies as recent as May of 2007, he emphasized 
the impact on the labor force of any change in entry policy. In Briggs’s 
view, each entrant should be judged for: 1) their ability to bring human 
capital with them when they enter the country, 2) the probability that 
an individual entering the country will be an asset to the U.S. economy, 
and 3) particularly with regard to subpopulations, such as political refu-
gees and asylees, the probability that the individual will not become or 
remain welfare dependent. Briggs’s belief in viable economic account-
ability is captured in the following quote:
The United States needs to adopt an immigration policy that is con-
sistent with its rapidly changing labor-market trends. If congruent, 
immigration policy can provide a valuable tool to national efforts 
to enhance economic effi ciency and to achieve societal equity. If 
contradictory, immigration policy can present a major barrier to 
the accomplishment of either or both goals. The luxury of allowing 
immigration policy to continue to be determined on political crite-
ria (i.e., to placate special interest groups) and to achieve idealistic 
social dreams (i.e., to pursue diversity simply for its own sake) 
can ill be afforded. Making immigration policy primarily a human 
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resource development policy would give immigration policy what 
it now lacks: economic accountability for most of what it does. 
(Briggs 2003a, p. 282)
With regard to political refugee and asylee policy, however, Briggs’s 
economic accountability idea is open to debate. In a paper presented in 
2003 before the Association for Evolutionary Economics, Briggs con-
tended that “unexpected consequences” of immigration policy have 
played a signifi cant part in the creation of poverty in the United States 
since 1965. Listing six of these consequences, Briggs described number 
fi ve as the “extensive admission of refugees, mostly from third-world 
nations.” Number six on Briggs’s list is as follows: “The arrival of many 
poor persons, also from mostly the third world, who often falsely make 
claims for political asylum to justify their presence and then abscond 
before their hearing dates are held or, if they receive a negative ruling, 
after being ordered to depart” (Briggs 2003b, p. 328).
I believe Briggs overstates the rather complex relationship between 
the entry of political refugees and asylees and U.S. poverty. For exam-
ple, the U.S. poverty rate fell from 12.6 percent in 2005 to 12.3 percent 
in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). Considering that the U.S. popula-
tion had recently surpassed 300 million people, a 12.3 percent poverty 
rate equates to approximately 36.9 million persons living in poverty. 
Even if the full allocation of 70,000 political refugees had been fi lled in 
2006, political refugees would still only amount to 0.002 percent of the 
nation’s impoverished persons. In fact, the actual number of political 
refugees admitted for 2006 was 41,150, and if one assumes that all of 
these people were living in poverty, then the percentage of the nation’s 
poor attributable to political refugee admissions would represent only 
0.0013 percent of the total number of poor persons for that year.
Further, the cumulative total of political refugees admitted from 
1980 to 2006 is less than 2.3 million. If every political refugee admitted 
to the United States during this period lives in poverty (which is clearly 
not true), they represent only 0.076 percent of the overall U.S. popula-
tion and less than 1 percent of the nation’s poor. Even with the most 
draconian effort to estimate the impact of the nation’s political refugee 
population, these numbers remain incredibly small. And they remain so 
even when the relatively small number of asylees is added to the mix.
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In 1994, in Still an Open Door? Briggs hypothesized that the ac-
commodation of political refugees and asylees would be a challenge 
to address in an overall immigration system based on economic needs. 
Then he and coauthor Stephen Moore made a number of recommenda-
tions for accomplishing this objective, including the following (Briggs 
and Moore 1994):
• A method should be instituted to expedite asylee applications 
and separate the legitimate claims for political asylum from 
claims by people who simply seek a pretext to enter the country 
for personal economic gain (the current process, which offers 
both an affi rmative and defensive route to asylum, probably 
does some of this, see TRAC Immigration [2006]).
• Even though political refugees should represent an exception to 
the rules of general immigration, restrictions on political refu-
gee levels should still be in place.
• U.S. support is critical for resettlement, repatriation, and main-
tenance of quality of life standards in the world’s refugee 
camps.
• The U.S. should link its foreign aid and foreign trade policies 
to adherence to human rights principles in those countries that 
generate mass numbers of political refugees.
• Once a political refugee is admitted, one less immigrant should 
be admitted.
Even with these recommendations, Briggs concluded by expressing 
doubts about the ability to fully accommodate refugees and asylees in 
an immigration system based on economic accountability, and I agree. 
Although economic concerns will always play a major role in interna-
tional affairs, there are certainly instances when foreign policy concerns 
or the execution of reciprocal humanitarian agreements may rise to 
greater prominence.  In those instances, refugee and asylee accommo-
dation, and the inclusion of a non-economic basis for entrant decision 
making, may assist in furthering the interests of the United States.
Indeed, one argument against strictly applying the consideration 
of economic accountability is that political refugees and asylees may 
have human capital characteristics that are much higher than gener-
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ally perceived. In Mass Immigration and the National Interest, Briggs 
indicates there have been times when the human capital characteristics 
of political refugees (including levels of education, years of experience 
in the formal labor market, and language[s] spoken) have measurably 
enhanced the characteristics of the entire immigrant population (Briggs 
2003a), but that is only part of the story.
I contend that refugees who make it to the United States for resettle-
ment are tremendously different from their less-resilient peers. Those 
who get here must have the ability to fl ee their country with virtually 
nothing, migrate to a host country (most often to a U.N.-sponsored
camp), convince a consortium of nongovernmental organization repre-
sentatives that they qualify as a political refugee, and get accepted for 
resettlement into the United States. To even undertake such a journey, 
many refugees have already demonstrated they possess personal quali-
ties that will promote their success in this country, including (but not 
limited to) risk taking, quick and effective decision making, the ability 
to convince others and to negotiate diffi cult bureaucracies, and resil-
ience in the face of overwhelming odds. This is obviously not true of 
all political refugees, but it is a safe bet to say that many, if not most, 
political refugees who resettle in this country are likely to do well, par-
ticularly when given a chance to do so over time (see Singer and Wilson 
2006).
Can—indeed, should—the consideration of “economic account-
ability for every entrant” serve as a foundation for U.S. political refugee 
and asylee policy? I do not think so.
Neutrality with Respect to Political Ideology
Briggs has often touted the need for neutrality with respect to politi-
cal ideology in the development, interpretation, and implementation of 
immigration and political refugee and asylee policy. Can neutrality with 
respect to political ideology ever become a strong consideration in po-
litical refugee and asylee policy? I believe this is an unachievable goal. 
And if ever achieved, it would be very diffi cult to maintain.
Any student of U.S. political and refugee policy would do well to 
read Briggs’s view of how political refugee and asylee policy became 
politicized in the United States (Briggs 2003a, pp. 136–173). That 
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discussion, in a chapter titled “Unexpected Consequences,” leads the 
reader through the years 1965 to 1994, from President Lyndon Johnson 
to President Bill Clinton. Briggs carefully outlines the government’s 
increasingly politicized response to crises facing a diverse group of 
refugee populations, including Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, Guate-
malans, and Salvadorans. He concludes this section of the book with a 
heading, “The Continuing Weakness of Asylee Policy” (Briggs 2003a, 
p. 170).
For the nation to move beyond a highly politicized policy, Briggs 
stresses that social goals must override political goals (Briggs 2003a). 
Thus, he argues that social goals, such as compassion, humanitarian-
ism, and a desire to reduce discrimination, should take precedence over 
political goals, such as enhanced use of family reunifi cation in political 
refugee and asylee policy. The notion appears to be in congruence with 
philosopher John Rawls’s view of society, which maintains, “In a just 
society the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargain-
ing or the calculus of social interests” (Keat and Miller 1974, p. 4). 
Without politics, however, what would give meaning to “social goals”? 
It is diffi cult to accept the suggestion that political aims would or could 
ever be absent in any policy arena, especially in one that involves the 
relationship between the United States and the rest of the world.
Is the world really a better place when a superpower like the United 
States fails to take an ideological stand on the many important policy 
questions associated with political refugee or asylee policy? The down-
side risk of not taking a stand is, to quote a popular country song, “If 
you don’t stand for something, you stand for nothing.” Since the U.S. 
Constitution does not spell out an entry policy, immigration and refugee 
policies are, as Briggs recognizes, “a purely discretionary duty of the 
U.S. government” (Briggs 2001, p. 5). Within this rather arbitrary dis-
cretionary duty, I believe, is the opportunity for the nation to stand for 
something, which includes adopting a never-wavering position on hu-
man rights (as expressed in the U.N.’s Declaration of Human Rights) and 
opposing totalitarian regimes. My fear is that unless a proactive (rather 
than a neutral) political ideology is fi rmly embraced in political refugee 
and asylee policy, it will always be chaotic and implemented with no 
enduring purpose except to fuel the bureaucracy of government.
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We need to remember that in the case of political refugees and asyl-
ees, U.S.-based policymakers are, by default, publicly declaring that 
another national government cannot, or will not, protect its own citi-
zens. In political asylee cases, policymakers are saying that it is more 
than reasonable to support the claim of an individual who maintains 
his or her life or freedom will be threatened if they are returned to their 
homeland (Jeffreys 2007). Few (if any) national governments wish to 
be deemed unable or unwilling to protect their citizens.
Perhaps an alternative approach is to slightly change the question 
to “How might neutrality with respect to political ideology become a 
meaningful contributor in political refugee and asylee policy?” With 
that in mind, I offer the following recommendations.
First, eligibility criteria for the status of either a political refugee or 
a political asylee need to be broadened. As noted earlier in this chap-
ter, the persecution standard in the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 is linked 
to an individual’s experience and a well-founded fear of persecution. 
However, much of the international community (as particularly noted in 
the defi nition of a refugee by the former Organization of African Unity 
and now the African Union, and in the Americas, as expressed in the 
Cartegena Declaration of 1984) sees political refugee and asylee status 
as more closely associated with group fl ight. If U.S. refugee and asylee 
policy is ever to become more neutral with respect to political ideology, 
then the U.S. standard of persecution should probably be expanded to 
include considerations such as conditions that caused one to fl ee home 
(not just their country), general chaos or violence in the applicant’s 
homeland, and fl ight as a member of a family or community (not just 
fl ight related to race, religion, political opinion, or nationality).
Second, the United States may need to more fully embrace the idea 
of participating in the development of a regional alliance with the coun-
tries of the Americas and the Caribbean. Such an alliance could help 
achieve a more neutral ideology with respect to hemispheric political 
refugee and asylee policies. At present, the countries of Latin America 
have varied defi nitions and standards in these two policy areas. The 
U.S. defi nition, while congruent with the U.N. standard, may need to be 
tweaked and brought into greater congruence with an overall policy in 
the Americas (Fischel de Andrade 1998).
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Third, the use of U.S. political refugee and asylee policy to achieve 
“national security” in a post–September 11 world is problematic if the 
goal is to achieve a more neutral political ideology (Kerwin 2005). A 
number of policy actions supposedly aimed at helping to achieve na-
tional security, including reductions in refugee admissions, the criminal 
prosecution of asylum seekers, and the blanket detention of Haitians, do 
little to advance public safety. Indeed, they violate the rights of politi-
cal refugee and asylee seekers, and they fuel, rather than neutralize, the 
spread of political ideology (both at home and abroad) (Kerwin 2005, p. 
755). Replacing the “fear of persecution” consideration with a more eas-
ily applied standard involving “human security” could help reduce the 
urge to manipulate political ideology from case to case (Afzal 2006).
In short, political refugee and asylee policy cannot and should not 
be made neutral with respect to political ideology. Like the notion of 
economic accountability for every entrant, political neutrality cannot 
serve as the foundation for this policy, though the problems of politici-
zation that Briggs identifi es are real, and there may indeed be room for 
some movement in the general direction of greater neutrality.
Societal Equity
Can the consideration of social equity ever become the foundation 
for decision making in the complex arena of political refugee and asylee 
policy? I believe so. And Briggs helps us in that effort. His work is 
a good starting point, and extension of his ideas on this matter could 
come easily.
Briggs’s scholarship consistently mentions societal equity as an im-
migration consideration. In the foreword to Mass Immigration and the 
National Interest, for example, he makes the point with a statement 
from the 1994 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform: “It is both a 
right and a responsibility of a democratic society to manage immigra-
tion so that it serves the national interest” (Briggs 2003a, p. v). For 
Briggs, linking public policy to the national interest means serving the 
greater good and is a powerful expression of societal equity concerns. 
Thus, he consistently criticizes advocates for any particular group of 
potential political refugees or asylees for tending to overlook the na-
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tional interest and focusing too narrowly on the needs of persons in a 
particular group.
Briggs also highlights societal equity when he emphasizes the 
plight of members of less-advantaged groups in the United States. In 
Chicanos and Rural Poverty, for example, he stated that if the goal is 
to create a more “equitable and humane society,” then it is necessary 
in all policy work to keep attention on the impact of policy on disad-
vantaged subpopulations (Briggs 1973, p. 1). Even a cursory review 
of Briggs’s scholarship reveals a great deal of attention devoted to the 
link between policy (development, interpretation, and implementation) 
and its impact on low-wage workers, particularly those who are African 
Americans, rural residents, or agricultural workers, whom he has often 
referred to (lamentingly, of course) as “second-class citizens.”
Briggs is especially mindful of the often-unintended consequences 
of public policies and the unequally distributed negative impact of social 
legislation on unskilled workers. He reminds us that not all low-wage 
workers experience equally the benefi ts of the U.S. labor movement’s 
policy achievements, which include minimum-wage protection, unem-
ployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and the right to engage in 
collective bargaining (Briggs 2001).
Briggs often cites the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights as an 
argument for including societal equity as a fundamental immigration 
consideration. He emphasizes Article 14, which (as mentioned earlier) 
includes the right to seek asylum in any country while fl eeing persecu-
tion, and Article 28, which states that “everyone is entitled to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized” (Offi ce of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 1948).
Even though Briggs speaks of social equity as a consideration in 
political refugee and asylee policy, his work could be more valuable 
if clarifi ed and extended. What should be the philosophical and con-
ceptual foundation for a consideration of social equity? What guiding 
principles or criteria should be used when applying the consideration of 
social equity? Although Briggs does not say so directly, John Rawls’s 
(1971) A Theory of Justice appears to have infl uenced his thinking. If 
so, he would not be alone; Rawls infl uenced many academics and ad-
vocates whose careers were hitting their stride in the 1970s and whose 
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interests involved matters of social equity. Yet Rawls was a theoreti-
cian, and most of what Briggs reached for in his career was application 
into the world of actual policy and policy decisions. Thus, Briggs and 
others who extend his work may want to consider the following.
First, the United States needs to return to its position of prominence 
in the international community of nations that accept political refugees. 
If societal equity is to be considered more prominently in the U.S. po-
litical and refugee policy landscape, then the country’s failure to even 
meet the annual allocation for political refugees must be reversed. A 
numerical allocation of 70,000 potential political refugees is not an un-
tenable number, especially considering the existence of over 40 million 
refugees and persons displaced by violence and persecution around the 
world (Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2007). 
Second, in discussions and negotiations with the international com-
munity, the United States has often spoken with a sanctimonious voice 
and criticized other countries for their political refugee and asylee poli-
cies, especially in the event of uneven implementation of those policies 
(China is just one example). The United States can take a lofty position 
partly because our borders are far from most refugee-producing coun-
tries, but even we have had our problems, especially when dealing with 
refugees and asylum seekers from Cuba, Haiti, and Central America. 
If societal equity is to be a more viable consideration in U.S. political 
refugee and asylee policy, then that policy must refl ect our geographic 
proximity to countries in the Caribbean and Latin America.
At the top of my reform list would be a policy that ensures com-
plete congruence of the treatment of Haitians and Cubans. Haiti has 
become more peaceful since holding national elections in 2007, and 
Cuba continues to move closer to an economic system characterized 
by market exchange. Thus, we can no longer assume that all Haitian 
nationals are fl eeing poverty and thus not generally eligible for political 
refugee or asylee status and that all claims by Cubans are legitimate. 
Under three U.S. presidents, this country has suffered incalculable em-
barrassment in the international community by stressing poverty too 
strongly as a disqualifying characteristic in the adjudication of Haitian 
asylee claims. Granted, fl eeing poverty need not be the only standard, 
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but when combined with fl eeing oppression or violence, it need not 
summarily disqualify an individual.
Briggs’s work can serve as a foundation for enhancing the use of 
social equity as a consideration in political refugee and asylee policy, 
but realizing that goal requires an extension of his work in the areas and 
along the lines described above.
MY TRUE PURPOSE
In responding to the invitation to write this chapter, my offi cially 
stated purpose was to write an academic piece on some element of im-
migration policy using Briggs’s work. Thus, I have focused on political 
refugee and asylee policy and attempted to assess Briggs’s use of three 
major considerations—economic accountability for each entry deci-
sion, neutrality with respect to political ideology, and social equity. I 
hope I have done so in a manner respectful of Briggs’s legacy of im-
pressive work.
But my unoffi cial purpose for writing the chapter is to thank Dr. 
Briggs. He opened my eyes to the world of immigration in general and 
to political refugee and asylee policy in particular. He showed me how 
an interest in federal social-policy formulation, local-level impact, and 
community-driven efforts to shape those policies all fi t perfectly within 
the dynamic policy arena of political refugee and asylee policy. It was 
Briggs who suggested I travel to Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoras, 
Mexico, to collect dissertation data as Central Americans fl ed country-
based violence and streamed through south Texas in the late 1980s. It 
was Briggs who said go there and witness fi rsthand the hardscrabble 
reality of what had previously been only an abstract academic interest. 
He set me on a lifetime path as an academic. I will be forever grateful.
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Note
1. Although individuals seeking political refugee or political asylee status are both 
seeking sanctuary, have crossed over the international border of their homeland, 
and must meet the defi nitional criteria for fl eeing a “well-founded fear of perse-
cution,” differences do exist. The major differences between the two are in the 
journey the person undertakes and the site from which the application for either 
refugee or asylee status is made. Persons seeking refugee status do so most often 
from within the confi nes of a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
sponsored camp and outside the borders of the country of desired resettlement. 
Persons seeking political asylee status do so after fi rst leaving their home country 
and then initially or eventually entering the country within which they wish to 
remain. Both require a recognition by the United States federal government of a 
country whose federal government cannot protect its own citizens and represent 
one of only three areas of designation by which people can enter the United States, 
the other two being family reunifi cation and labor economics.
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